This paper exposes the wish of the colonial power to secure public authority through the process of installing a public pawnshop(公設質屋) at Kyungsung(京城), finally taking notice of its inborn impasse. The social relationship possessed by the Ch’eondangpo(pawnshop; 典當鋪) and Sichiya( Japanese-style pawnshop; 質屋) at Kyungsung was never considered in the public welfare service of Chosun, which led to the direct opposition from the owner of Ch’eondangpo and Sichiya and then to a dispute at the city council in 1929. Kyungsung city’s efforts to resolve this bore some fruit at the city council in 1931 through ‘alliance’ with Chosun representatives, reaching the agreement that the public pawnshop should be increased in number. However, this need never materialized properly throughout the colonial period. In this sense, the public authority of the colonial power was very weak.
Ch’eondangpo and Sichiya were the most typical financial services for the working class in Kyungsung at the colonial period. Both were the same in the frame of operations, such as conferring about the interest rates and terms of foreclosure from each of association, but with a clear difference in the owner’s ethnic component, distribution area, etc. The colonial power of the colonial Japanese authorities and Kyungsung city struggled to manage these Ch’eondangpo and Sichiya. At first, they sought for expedient control but the social work on the imperial scale appearing in the 1920’s made them reconsider the existing method of control. That is, the colonial power made an attempt to deprive both styles of pawnshop of social nature by establishing a public pawnshop.
However, the colonial power had difficulty interpreting many social problems surrounding Ch’eondangpo and Sichiya in terms of ‘Chosun things.’ Besides, they failed to be quick in taking sole possession of the idea of ‘public interest’ needed for its resolution, either. In the meantime, the association as an interest group proceeded to interpret the public benefit in a different way than the colonial power. Such a situation evolved into the aspect of collision and alliance among political powers at the city council in 1929 and 1931. Here worked the colonial power like Kyunsung city, different views between Chosun and Japanese representatives as variables. Though, at last, East Public Pawnshop(東部公益質屋) and West Public Pawnshop(西部公益質屋) were established in December 1929 and December 1931, respectively, it was far too short to support the public representative nature held by the colonial power. This case of Kyungsung well illustrates why the attempt of the colonial power to secure public authority had to fail inescapably.